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Thispaper computes the expected present value of Social Security
retirement benefits and taxes for households of different marital circumstances,
incomes, and age cohorts. Also computed are the net gain or loss from partici-
pation in the system and the expected internal rate of return it offers various
participants. The paper calculates the marginal linkage between benefits and
contributions, and also examines how the age of entry into the covered workforce
affects the participant. All computations are made for the 1985 Social
Security and income tax laws. The general results are that Social Security
offers vastly different terms to households in different circumstances. The
net gain or loss varies by $200,000 and the real internal rate of return on
contributions ranges from negative numbers to 6.6% for households of different
ages, income levels, and marital status. These differences are far greater
than the widely debated distributional affects of relevant income tax
alternatives. We also find that there is a great deal of variance in the
marginal linkage of benefits and taxes with many households facing a situation
where the present value of benefits increases from 0 to 30 cents per extra
dollar of taxes paid.
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For most Americans, anticipated Social Security retirement benefits have a
value larger than the total value of their other financial assets.* Likewise,
more than half of the workers in the United States pay more in OASDHI
"contributions" than they pay in personal income taxes. Because the program
looms so large in the financial picture of so many, it is reasonable to assune
that there is a significant demand for an investment evaluation of the deal it
offers Americans. However, the program is extremely complex, with the expected
benefits depending on one's marital status, sex, age-earnings profile, length
of career, number of children, and other factors.
In this paper we simplify the analysis by exclusively evaluating the
retirement portion of the program. We also only examine it from the
perspective of the household or the individual and our study is partial
equilibrium in the sense that we do not tackle the consequences of the program
for labor force participation or private saving behavior. Further, the
household or individual is not particularly concerned about whether the program
is fully funded or on a pay-as-you-go basis. What the participant is
interested in is how large are his or her taxes (or "contributions" or
"investments") and what is the expected value of benefits to which he or she
will be entitled. The economically sophisticated household will also be
interested in the marginal linkage between taxes and benefits. That is, they
would like to know the incremental value of the retirement benefits for an
incremental payment of Social Security taxes. We calculate this marginal
linkage as well as the expected present value of taxes and benefits for
*
Thisvalue may very well be enhanced by the fact that the benefits are paid
out as an inflation adjusted life annuity.
1households of different income levels, marital status, and belonging to
different age cohorts. In computing the present value, we use a three percent
real discount rate, although some sensitivity analysis to that figure is
presented in the Appendix to the paper. We also calculate the present value of
transfers offered by Social Security as the difference between the present
value of benefits and taxes. The transfer figure is the surplus or gain one
receives from participating in the system (if the figure is positive).
Finally, we compute the internal rate of return offered by the retirement
portion of Social Security. That is, we calculate the rate of discount which
equates the expected present value of benefits with the expected present value
of taxes. Throughout the analysis, we assume the participant bears the burden
or effectively pays both the employer and the employee contributions to the
sys tern.
The emphasis of the paper is to calculate the financial terms of Social
Security for households in different circumstances. Our results indicate that
the "deal" varies enormously by marital status, income, and cohort. The
difference in the transfer figures for different households examined can exceed
$200,000. The internal rate of return ranges from our six percent to negative
numbers. And, the linkage between incremental taxes and benefits can be
significant or zero, depending on the particular household's circumstances.
While some of these differences are undoubtedly intentional, others are
probably not. It is our feeling that both participants and analysts of Social
Security need this information in order to evaluate the current structure of
the program.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows:the next section
contains a brief survey of related literature. Then, section three describes
our methodology and data. The intergenerational results are contained insection four, while the intragenerational results are presented in the fifth
section. The sixth section looks at both the relationship of benefits to
remaining lifetime taxes and the marginal linkage of taxes and benefits. The
paper concludes with some observations on the importance of our findings.
32. Literature Review
Several studies have attempted to estimate the "deal" various households
have received or can expect to receive from Social Security's retirement
program. The general conclusion is that the early cohorts of retirees had very
large rates of return on their taxes and that future retirees, especially
well off ones, are likely to fare poorly, with a rate of return below that
available on private assets. Hurd and Shoven (1985) document this pattern of
rates of return for various cohorts and earnings levels, but their analysis was
made prior to the 1983 amendments and hence does not include consideration of
the increased age of eligibility for future retirees or the partial taxation of
benefits. Also, there have been some changes in the economic and demographic
assumptions used by the Social Security Administration.
Boskin, Avrin, and Cone (1983) report the average transfer per household
and for aggregate ten year age cohorts, with transfers defined as the
difference in the expected present value of benefits and taxes. They also
present estimates of how different cohorts and the system finances as a whole
would be affected by various policy changes, such as increases in the
retirement age. They conclude that those retiring recently are receiving
benefits which are about three times as large as the sum of their employee and
employer contributions plus three percent real interest, i.e. about two-thirds
of their benefits are transfers as defined above.
These results are updated to the post-1983 amendments case in Boskin
(1986). The pattern of transfers remains qualitatively similar to that
mentioned above, but attention is called to the fact that OASDI is unlikely to
be financially solvent over the next 75 years, despite the 1983 amendments. The
financial solvency problem is much worse if HI is included. Thus, how and when
the financial solvency issue is addressed will affect the Social Security
benefits, taxes and transfers of individuals of various ages, income levels and
4marital status quite differently. For example, changes in the tax rates,
benefit formulas, the age of eligibility for full retirement benefits, or the
method of financing Social Security could impact various households quite
differently.
Finally, Pellechio and Goodfellow (1983) attempt to examine the net impact
of the 1983 amendments on various types of households. Their analysis is
similar in spirit to the analysis presented below. However, the range of
cases, the updating to 1985 SSA assumptions, the sensitivity analyses, the
examination of the marginal linkage between taxes paid and benefits received
and the analysis of the relationship between benefits and future taxes (as
opposed to lifetime taxes which include taxes already paid), are but some of
the innovations in our work.
53. Methodology and Data
In the present study, we use a computer simulation to convert assumptions
about households' wages, expected mortality, and economy-wide growth in real
wages into expected values of Social Security taxes, benefits, net transfers
(positive or negative) and internal rates of return. Assumed wage histories
lead in a straight-forward manner (following legal provisions) to derivation of
taxes paid during working lives and benefits received after retirement. A
separate procedure, described below, determines income-taxation of benefits.
These taxes and net-of-income-tax benefits are weighted by the probabilities of
household members remaining alive at each age and discounted (we consider real
rates of 2%, 3%, and 4%) to a common year (we use both 1985 and the year a
household reaches age 25). We also derive the transfer, or difference between
discounted expected taxes and benefits, and the internal real rate of return,
the rate at which discounted expected taxes equal discounted benefits.
We consider typical households which differ in a number of respects: in
marital status, the amount of total household earnings, and the division of
total earnings between wife and husband. We also compare households born in
1915, 1930, 1945, 1960, 1975, and 1990, since these cohorts differ in the tax
rates they pay, the economy's level of real wages, and life expectancy.
Husbands and wives are presumed born in the same year.
For most of the results reported below we assume that individuals work,
and pay Social Security taxes, from age 21 until they become eligible for full
retirement benefits -atage 65 for those born in 1915 and 1930, 66 for those
born in 1945, and 67 for later cohorts. We also, however, consider results for
individuals who begin work at ages 18, 25, and 30. We do not consider
unemployment.
6Wages vary for individuals both with economy-wide wage growth (as indexed
by the Social Security Administration's "Average Wage Series") and according to
their age: we assume that male wages increase one percent per year ofage
beyond the economy-wide growth in wages until age 50 and that female wages
increase one-half percent per year of age until age 50. The "earnings levels"
reported in the tables below correspond to the 1960 cohort -- 25-year-oldsin
1985. By 2010, when the 1960 cohort is 50 years old, its real wages will have
increased 45 percent with economy-wide wage growth plus an additional 28.4
percent for males and 13.3 percent for females in keeping with their age-
profile of wages. The 1930 and 1945 cohorts have wages in 1985 which vary by
the age-profile from the "earnings level" listed. All cohorts other than the
1960 cohort have age-25 wages which differ from that reported as the "earnings
level" by the difference in the wage index between 1985 and the year they are
25. In our principal research we follow the Social Security Administration's
intermediate assumption (Assumption Il-B) for future wage growth; however, we
do consider other assumptions as well below.
In considering expected values of taxes and benefits we assume 100 percent
* survivalonly until age 25.Subsequent taxes and benefits are weighted by the
probabilities of individuals remaining alive at each age. Since wives may
collect spouse or survivors' benefits based on their husbands' earnings
histories, we derive their benefits as the weighted average of benefits for
each age of husband death, including death before retirement. Marriages are
assumed to take place at age 25, widows are assumed to remain single, and
divorce is not considered.
*
25is the age at which we compare households in different cohorts. It is
the age of the 1960 cohort -thefirst cohort in the mature system -in1985,
the base year for most of our reported results.
/Mortality probabilities are considered separately for males and females.
Separate mortality tables are used for each cohort. The tables used are those
used for the intermediate assumption (Assumption II) in the 1983 Annual Report
of the Board of Trustees of the Old Age and Survivors' Insurance and Disability
Insurance Trust Funds.The male and female life expectancies implicit in
these tables, conditional on survival to age 25, are 71.2 and 79.0 years for those
born in 1915, 72.1 and 79.8 for 1930, 73.9 and 81.4 for 1945, 74.6 and 82.1 for
1960, 75.3 and 82.9 for 1975, and 76.0 and 83.6 for 1990.
Another matter of some importance which we do not consider is the existence
of beneficiaries other than retirees and their spouses -especiallythe young
children of retirees and deceased persons. Currently about 7% of OASI benefits
go to (or to surviving spouses on behalf of) such beneficiaries, and about 4%
** ofbenefits are expected to go to such beneficiaries in the long-run future.
The recent legislation of taxation of Social Security benefits has added sub-
stantial complication to our derivations. The law provides for the taxation as
ordinary income of half one's benefits to the extent that this portion of one's
benefits, plus other adjusted gross income, exceeds the un-indexed threshold levels
of $25,000 for singles and $32,000 for couples. The chief difficulty arises in
deriving adjusted gross income and marginal tax rates for retired households for
which we otherwise make assumptions only about wage income in pre-retirement years.
Our procedure is as follows: Census Bureau data are used to determine the
percentile rankings of the household earnings levels we consider. IRS
*SocialSecurity Administration, Actuarial Study No. 88, 1983.
**Derivedfrom Social Security Bulletin, 1982 Annual Statistical Supplement,
Table 54, and 1985 Report of the Trustees of the Old Age and Survivors and
Disability Insurance Trust Funds, Table A3.
"Money Income of Households, Families, and Persons in the United States:
1983," Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 146,
Table 34. The figures are for wage, salary, and self-employment income for all
married households and unrelated individuals ages 25-64 with some such income.
8data are used to determine the adjusted gross income and taxable earnings of
taxpayers over age 65 which correspond to these same percentile rankings.*
These figures for adjusted gross income and taxable earnings are assumed to
vary with our wage index from the year of the data to the year five years after
a cohort's retirement, but to vary for each given cohort only with the Consumer
Price Index. The figures for adjusted gross income determine the amount of
benefits subject to taxation, while the figures for taxable earnings determine
the marginal tax rate which is applied. Since tax brackets are indexed by the
CPI a common marginal tax rate is thus derived for all years of one's
retirement. We have not added the complication of considering that part of
benefits will generally fall within higher brackets.
*
DanHolik and John Kozielec, "Taxpayers Age 65 or Over, 1977-81," Internal
Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Bulletin 4,1 (Summer 1984): 1-16,
Table 2. The figures are for all income-tax returns filed for 1981 by
those age 65 or over.
94. Intergenerational Transfers in Social Security
Social Security -whenit was introduced and each time it has expanded -
hasbeen a major vehicle for transferring resources from the younger, richer,
working generation to the older, poorer, retired generation. While part of
this public redistribution of wealth between generations may be offset by
private intrafamily intergenerational transfers, it is unlikely that this
* offsetis sufficient to alter our general conclusions.While the percentage
of transfers in benefits is largest for the first cohort of retirees (who
receive virtually a complete windfall), the positive intergenerational
transfers received by retirees may continue to be substantial for decades,
turning negative for subsequent retirees.
Tables lA and lB highlight the expected intergenerational transfers under
current law and the Social Security Administration's intermediate (II.B)
**
economicand demographic projections. Table lA compares the expected present
value of benefits, taxes, and transfers (the difference between benefits and
taxes) across six cohorts of curent and future retirees at various earnings
levels. It also presents the internal rate of return on the taxes paid, i.e.
the rate which equates the expected present values of taxes and benefits. The
dollar figures are discounted at a real 3% rate; sensitivity analyses to
variations in the discount rate are discussed in the appendix.
The three earnings levels presented ($10,000, $30,000, and $50,000) are
wage indexed levels for 1985. For the 1960 cohort, they represent actual 1985
wages at age 25. For the 1945 cohort, actual earnings levels at the age of 40
*
Theargument is made most forcefully by Barro (1978); however, see Boskin
and Kotlikoff (1986) for an empirical refutation of the Barro model.
**
Thereis some ambiguity concerning these assumptions due to the fact that
the OASDI system is not actuarially solvent over the next 75 years. See Boskin
(1986) for a discussion of the magnitude, sources and implications of this
problem.
10Table 1A
Comparison Across Cohorts of
Single-earner Couples, Various Earnings Levels
(1985 dollars discounted at rate 3% to 1985)
Earnings Level
(at 1985 wage index)
Year of Birth 10,000 30,00050,000
1915 P.V. Benefits 92,277144,845 133,969
P.V. Taxes 36,280 68,34072,205
P.V. Transfer 55,997 76,50561,764
Rate of Return 6.6% 5.81% 5.23%
1930 P.V. Benefits 77,524122,968 114,499
P.V. Taxes 48,176110,574 110,848
P.V. Transfer 29,34812,394 3,651
Rate of Return 4.56% 3.38% 3.12%
1945 P.V. Benefits 62,679109,128 100,503
P.V. Taxes 48,951136,498 140,253
P.V. Transfer 13,727-27,370 -39,750
Rate Of Return 3.74% 2.30% 1.95%
1960 P.V. Benefits 46,546 84,059 76,842
P.V. Taxes 41,263123,788 138,302
P.V. Transfer 5,283-39,728 -61,459
Rate of Return 3.35% 1.85% 1.30%
1975 P.V. Benefits 37,77467,46463,051
P.V. Taxes 33,27399,819112,081
P.V. Transfer 4,501-32,355 -49,028
Rate Of Return 3.37% 1.85% 1.36%
1990 P.V. Benefits 30,60754,27850,314
P.V. Taxes 26,39979,19688,866
P.V. Transfer 4,208-24,918 -38,551
Rate of Return 3.43% 1.90% 1.39%
11for low-wage males in 1985 would be $11,610, which exceeds the $10,000 figure
by 15 years of movement along their age earnings profile. For the 1915 cohort,
which is 70 in 1985, these figures must be deflated by the real wage index to
ascertain their actual wages earlier in their lives; similarly, for cohorts not
yet working, these figures would be compounded at real wage growth projections
(1.5%/annum in the II.B scenario) to ascertain the actual future real wages at
age 25, and at real wage growth plus the movement alongthe age-earnings
profile from age 25 to 50. Thus, as one moves down a column across cohorts, we
are, roughly speaking, maintaining the relative position in the income
distribution. The three earnings levels correspond roughly to the poverty
line, median income, and the earnings of well-off professionals above the
taxable maximum ceiling, respectively.
Table 1A reveals, reading down each column (within earnings classes, across
age cohorts), that the internal rate of return declines rapidlyfor the first four
cohorts; for example, from 6.6% to 3.4% for the $10,000 earnings level and from 5.2%
to 1.3% for the $50,000 earnings level. The youngest two cohorts are presently
expected to receive rates of return about equal to the 1960 cohort. This occurs
because their increasing life expectancy offsets increased taxation of
*
benefits.However, the returns of 9% or so received by the 1905-1910 cohort
(who paid taxes for five to ten fewer years than the 1915 cohort) are no longer
evident, despite successive expansions of the system. The start-up effect is
roughly over by the 1945 cohort.
Next, notice that future poor families will receive only very small
transfers -- amountingto a present value of $4,000 or $5,000 from 1960
onwards. Despite the progressive nature of the benefit formula, current Social
Security law does little for poor working families in the future.
*
Asreported in Hurd and Shoven (1985).
12The present value of transfers turns negative as early as the 1945 cohort
for the earnings levels above $10,000. Correspondingly, the internal rates of
return drop below 3%. For the $50,000 earnings level, the (negative) transfer
peaks at over $61,000 for the 1960 cohort (the real wage growth of 1
does not offset the higher discount rate, so later cohorts appear to do better,
discounted to 1985).
Looking across columns within each age cohort reveals some interesting
results. First, while for the 1915 cohort, the rates of return are highest for
the poorest families, the absolute dollars of transfers are higher for the
middle and upper-income family. The reason is that the level of participation
in Social Security is related to earnings. Higher wage workers in this cohort
were allowed to play in a favorable game for higher stakes. The positive
transfers to the rich continue in the 1930 cohort. The deal for the rich,
absolutely and relatively, worsens dramatically relative to the other earnings
levels in succeeding cohorts.
Table lB presents analogous numbers to those in Table lA, but discounted
to the year each cohort reaches age 25 -roughlyspeaking when they "enter" the
system. The dollar figures, while discounted to different years, are all in
constant 1985 dollars. Real wages and taxes increase cohort to cohort, and
starting Social Security benefits are wage-indexed, so the internal rates of
return, for each cohort and earnings level combination, are identical to those
reported in Table 1A. If we take the 1990 cohort and the $50,000 earnings
level, the expected value of the loss for the family is $93,573, discounted to
2015. Discounted to 1985, the figure becomes $38,551, the corresponding entry
in Table 1A.
In summary, the intergenerational transfers in Social Security have been,
and continue to be, substantial. The size of such transfers varies
substantially by cohort and earnings level. In the next section, we will see
13Table lB
Comparison Across Cohorts of
Single-earner Couples, Various Earnings Levels
(1985 dollars discounted at rate 3%
to the year in which cohort is age 25.)
Earnings Level
(at 1985 wage index)
Yearof Birth 10,000 30,000 50,000
(YearAge 25)
1915 P.V. Benefits 24,402 38,303 35,427
(1940) P,V. Taxes 9,594 18,072 19,094
P.V. Transfer 14,808 20,231 16,333
Rate of Return 6.6% 5.81% 5.23%
1930 P.V. Benefits 31,939 50,661 47,172
(1955) P.V. Taxes 19,848 45,555 45,668
P.V. Transfer 12,091 5,106 1,504
Rate of Return 4.56% 3.38% 3.12%
1945 P.V. Benefits 40,231 70,045 64,509
(1970) P.V. Taxes 31,420 87,613 90,023
P.V. Transfer 8,811 -17,568 -25,514
Rate of Return 3.74% 2.30% 1.95%
1960 P.V, Benefits 46,546 84,059 76,842
(1985) P.V, Taxes 41,263 123,788138,302
P,V. Transfer 5,283 -39,728 -61,459
Rate of Return 3.35% 1.85% 1.30%
1975 P.V. Benefits 58,851105,106 98,232
(2000) P.V. Taxes 51,839155,515 174,618
P.V. Transfer 7,013 -50,408-76,384
Rate of Return 3.37% 1.85% 1.36%
1990 P.V. Benefits 74,292131,746122,125
(2015) P.V. Taxes 64,077192,229215,700
P.V. Transfer 10,215 -60,482-93,573
Rate of Return 3.43% 1.90% 1.39%
iLLthat it also depends heavily on family status. Before doing so, we note two
points. First, the expected present value of benefits may underestimate the
value to the recipient because benefits are paid as indexed annuities. In the
absence of a well-functioning market for real annuities, risk averse households
will value the benefits at more than their expected present value. Because the
long run financial solvency of Social Security is uncertain, considerable
uncertainty exists concerning future benefits, especially for those retiring
*
manyyears from now.This risk discount probably partly offsets the annuity
bonus for those in the 1945 cohort or younger. Of course, for those already
retired, the annuity bonus dominates, and the deal is probably better than the
figures presented in the tables indicate.
One type of uncertainty is over future economic and demographic
conditions. In Table 2, we present estimates similar to those in Table lA for
the four cohorts beginning with 1945 under two alternative real wage growth
assumptions: the 2 per year growth assumed by SSA in their optimistic
scenario (I) and the 1% per year assumed in their pessimistic scenario (III).
The rates of return decline as we move from the optimistic to the intermediate
to the pessimistic real wage growth scenarios. The dollar amounts of transfers
also follow this path except for the wealthy group in the 1990 birth cohort.
This anomoly is similar to that reported above for the 1915 cohort, but in
reverse: this group is playing for higher stakes for longer in a
disadvantageous system, and therefore does better -interms of Social Security




Comparison of Assumptions About Real Wage Growth
for Single-earner Couples of Low and High Earnings
(1985 dollars discounted at rate 3% to 1985)
Earnings Levels: $10,000 $50,000---



















































































The current Social Security system not only offers different rates of
return to different generational cohorts, but also presents different
households within a cohort with significantly different expected rates of
return. We have examined the present value of expected benefits, taxes, and
transfers for single men and women of different income levels and for married
couples with different levels and composition of income. The results are shown
in Table 3 for the cohort born in 1945, and hence 40 years of age in 1985.
The upper-most segment of the table compares the expected present value of
retirement benefits and Social Security taxes for singles and one-earner
couples with the same level of earnings. In comparing the single male with the
one-earner couple with the same earnings history, note that while the expected
present value of taxes paid is the same, the expected present value of benefits
is more than twice as great for the married couple. This is due to the fact
that the couples receive an inflation indexed joint survivor annuity with the
initial benefit level set at 150 percent of the single person's benefit (as
long as both spouses survive). The surviving member of the couple receives a
benefit exactly equal to that of the single person. Thus, the benefits for
couples are 50 percent greater for a period of time, and have a longer expected
period of receipt. Naturally, these extra benefits for the same tax payments
translate into a higher expected real rate of return. In fact, couples,
regardless of the division of earnings, never do worse than two singles,
because the system permits couples to claim their own benefits as if they
were single. Of course, the fact that half of benefits may be subject to the
personal income tax alters this relationship somewhat.
A second fact which is evident in the upper most panel of Table 3A is
that single women receive a larger transfer (or a smaller negative transfer)
and a higher rate of return than single men. This is primarily a consequence
17of the longer life expectancy of women and the fact that the benefit levels do
not differ according to sex. Finally, that panel, and the rest of the table,
illustrates that higher income households in this cohort receive a lower real
rate of return and larger negative transfers than lower income households. At
a three percent real discount rate (i.e. if the opportunity cost of funds is
three percent), the single male loses $19,038 from the system if his wage at
25 is $10,000, but $84,216 if his wage at that age is $30,000, and $91,721 if
his wage is $50,000. The middle and upper income single males actually have a
negative expected real rate of return indicating that they cannot even expect
to recoup the purchasing power of their Social Security taxes.
How Social Security treats various members of the same cohort differently
can be expressed in several ways. If we still concentrate on the upper panel
of Table 3A, note that the rate of return ranges from -.6percent to 3.74
percent. Given that this is a large program which covers one's entire adult
lifetime, these rates of return differences translate into transfers ranging from
+$13,727 to -$91,721. These figures are large relative to the typical value of
a private pension and even relative to the median value of a house in the
United States in 1985.
The remainder of Table 3A explores the situation of two earner couples and
compares their outcomes to singles with the same earnings record. Note that
the expected present value of taxes paid by the couples is in all cases equal
to the sum of the singles with the same earnings levels. The couples with a
two-thirds/one-third income split still benefit from the spousal survivor
benefit, and thus they do better than their "component singles." However, the
women's taxes do not affect the couple's benefits at all, and hence there is
absolutely no linkage between her tax payments and retirement benefits. We
discuss the issue of linkage in greater depth in the next section. The final
18Table 3A
Comparison Across Family Types of
1945 Cohort, Various Earnings Levels
(1985 dollars discounted at rate 3% to 1985)
Earnings Level (at 1985 wage index)
(Husband-Wife earnings split)
Family Type


























































































































Comparison Across Family Types of
1945 Cohort, Various Earnings Levels
(1985 dollars discounted at rate 3% to 1985)
Earnings Level (at 1985 wage index)
(Husband-wife earnings split)





























































20panel of Table 3A compares two-earner couples with a 50-50 earnings split with
the corresponding singles. The general result is that the 50-50 couples do
somewhat worse than the -couplesand that they gain a little
from the wives collecting survivor benefits as widows rather than benefits
based on their own earnings histories.
Table 3B contains similar intragenerational transfer data as Table 3A,
except that it is for the cohort born in 1960. This cohort works one more
year, and hence doesn't retire until age 67. This implies more taxes and a
shorter annuity period. Offsetting this, however, is the fact that this
generation is projected to have a longer life expectancy than the 1945 cohort.
The table also adds a higher income bracket whose deal differs from the $50,000
category primarily because of having a higher personal income tax rate.
The results are similar to the previous table. However, the range of
transfers and rates of return is even wider, For the table as a whole, the
rate of return varies from -1.3 percent to 3.99 percent and the transfer
figures go from $5,449 to -$192,075. The general patterns are still that
single women do better than single men, that single earner couples do better
than two earner couples and that higher earnings households do worse than lower
earnings households. The important point of the table, however, is the
enormous magnitude of the differences, which are larger than those which
generate intense debate in the personal income tax, such as changing the
exemption level.
Table 4 shows the expected present value of retirement benefits, taxes,
and transfers, as well as the expected real rate of return, for different ages
at which work commences. Our standard assumption has been that individuals
enter the work force at age 21. In this table we look at three alternative
initial ages, 18, 25, and 30 for members of the 1945 birth cohort. Four
households of different marital status (all with a $30,000 earnings level as
21Table 3B
Comparison Across Family Types of
1960 Cohort, Various Earnings Levels
(1985 dollars discounted at rate 3% to 1985)
Earnings Level (at 1985 wage index)
(Husband-Wife earnings split)
























































































































































Comparison Across Family Types of
1960 Cohort, Various Earnings Levels
(1985 dollars discounted at rate 3% to 1985)
Earnings Level (at 1985 wage index)
(Husband-Wife earnings split)
Family Type 10,000 30,000 50,000 80,000
Two-earner Couple (5-5) (15-15) (25-25) (40-40)
P.V. Benefits 37,630 68,257 81,692 88,200
P.V. Taxes 40,391 121,174 201,956 280,275
P.V. Transfer -2,761 -52,917-120,264 -192,075
Rate of Return 2.79% 1.27% 0.24% -0.46%
Single Male (5,000) (15,000) (25,000) (40,000)
P,V. Benefits 16,300 29,141 37,066 38,607
P.V. Taxes 20,631 61,894 103,157 138,302
P.V. Transfer -4,331 -32,753 -66,090 -99,695
Rate of Return 2.27% 0.62% -0.27% -0.97%
Single Female (5000) (15,000) (25,000) (40,000)
P.V. Benefits 22,516 39,203 51,414 55,854
P.V. Taxes 19,760 59,280 98,800 141,972
P.V. Transfer 2,756 -20,077 -47,386 -86,188
Rate of Return 3.38% 1.79% 1.08% 0.28%
23Table 4
Effect of Starting Work at Different Ages for
1945 Cohort, $30,000 Earnings Level, Various Family Types
(1985 dollars discounted at rate 3% to 1985)
Family Type









P.V.Benefits 109,128 89,578 52,282 71,715
P.V.Taxes 136,498 143,777 136,498 130,802
P.V.Transfer -27,370 -54,199 -84,216 -59,087
Rateof Return 2.30% 1.54% -0.25% 1.13%
Beginwork at age18
P.V.Benefits 109,128 89,578 52,282 71,715
P.V.Taxes 142,605 153,760 142,605 136,911
P.V.Transfer -33,478 -64,182 -90,323 -65,196
Rateof Return 2,18% 1.39% -0.32% 1.04%
Beginwork at age25
P.V.Benefits 109,128 89,578 52,282 71,715
P.V.Taxes 126,116 129,930 126,116 120,420
P.V.Transfer -16,987 -40,350 -73,834 -48,705
Rateof Return • 2.52% 1.79% -0.12% 1.31%
Beginwork at age30
P.V.Benefits 108,371 89,427 52,282 71,715
P.V.Taxes 112,113 110,999 112,113 106,378
P.V.Transfer -3,742 -21,572 -59,831 -34,665
Rateof Return 2.88% 2.23% 0.13% 1.62%
24defined above --correspondingfor males to about $35,000 actual 1985 dollars
in 1985) are displayed in the four columns. The principal result of the table
is that those who delay entry into the labor force earn a higher rate of return
and higher transfers. The reason is that only the highest 35 years of earnings
are used in the calculation of Social Security retirement benefits. Thus, the
"missing years" do not depress benefits. Looking at it the other way around,
the taxes paid in the years in the labor force before age 30 have no affect on
benefits and, therefore, no linkage. They are truly taxes and in no part
pension contributions. This result would also apply, although perhaps with
less force, to any worker who spends several years in the uncovered sector.
The loss in benefits from such a departure can be zero or very low.
256. Other Issues
Results reported thus far deal with the total or average relationship
between Social Security, taxes paid and benefits received. In this section we
consider two further matters of importance: the marginal linkage between taxes
and benefits, and the importance of "sunk" taxes in determining people's
interest in maintaining the Social Security system in its present form.
The marginal linkage between Social Security taxes and benefits, and the
public's perception of this linkage, determine the extent to which individuals
treat Social Security taxes as wage taxes or as forced savings (analogous to
pension contributions) in their household economic decisions. To the extent
that Social Security taxes are treated as wage taxes they add to the
distortionary effects of income taxes (Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1985). Since
the distortionary effect of taxation rises with the square of the marginal tax
rate, the 10,4 percent of most people's wage income currently contributed to
Old Age and Survivors' Insurance could be nearly doubling any labor supply
distortion effects of income taxation. It may well be that uncertainty and
lack of information about the benefits which one may expect reduce the
perceived linkage between taxes and benefits (Boskin, Kotlikoff, and Shoven
(1985)); here we consider the actual extent of linkage.
Table S presents the ratios of marginal discounted expected benefits
divided by marginal discounted expected taxes for households of various
composition and various total earnings. The marginal taxes are distributed
over one's life in the same proportions as all one's Social Security taxes.
The marginal benefits which result from these taxes depend on three factors:
(1) one's bracket of the graduated, or "piece-wise linear," formula which
converts one's earnings history into retirement benefits, (2) whether one
collects benefits based on one's own or one's spouse's earnings history, and
(3) the marginal income-tax rate which is applied to up to half one's benefits.
26*
Atmaximum tax.
Note: aTax rates below 12% reflect an adjustment for the
proportion of low-income households which owe taxes at all.
27
Table 5
Discounted Expected Marginal Benefit per Marginal Taxes Paid,
with Extra Taxes Spread Over Lifetime,
for 1960 Cohort at 3% Real Discount Rate
EarningsLevel 1-earner 2-earner Single Single





















































































































*The formula which determines one's Primary Insurance Amount, the monthly
benefit one can get based on one's own earnings when one does not retire early,
has brackets in which a function of one's earnings history is multiplied by 90
percent, by 32 percent, and by 15 percent. Only those with very low earnings
histories have marginal benefits determined within the 90-percent bracket; this
bracket does not apply to any of the cases in Table 5.
Single males in the 32-percent bracket have a gross-of-income-tax marginal
linkage ratio of .368; in the 15-percent bracket the linkage ratio is .173.
Single females with a higher life expectancy, have linkage ratios of .503 in
the 32-percent bracket and .236 in the 15-percent bracket. The figures
reported in Table 5 reflect the reduction of these linkage ratios due to
income taxation of half one's benefits.
In single-earner couples, wives receive both spouse benefits of half their
husband's benefits while their husbands live and survivor benefits, equal to their
husbands' full benefits, after their husbands die. As a result of the "joint sur-
vivor annuity" which such couples get for the same taxes as are paid by single males,
the marginal linkage is more than twice that for single males. Gross of income
taxation it is .760 in the 32-percent bracket and .356 in the 15-percent bracket.
Wives in our two-earner couple examples have histories of earnings
slightly lower than those of their husbands. As a result, they can receive
higher benefits based on their own earnings histories rather than on their
husbands' earnings histories while their husbands live, but higher benefits
based on their husbands' earnings histories after they are widowed. Thus, the
linkage ratios for such couples due to additional tax paid by the husband are
between those for single males and for one-earner couples --.568in the 32-
percent bracket and .266 in the 15-percent bracket --whilethe linkage ratios
due to additional tax paid by the wife are below those for single females --
28In cases (not shown) where wife and husband earnings are equal, each
receives benefits based only on their own earnings, and the marginal linkages
are the same as for singles (except that as a couple with a combined income
they will be subject to a higher marginal income-tax rate). Where the wife's
earnings are greater than the husband's earnings, the husband will receive
survivor benefits based on the wife's earnings.
Where the husband's benefits are more than twice those of the wife, so that
the wife gets a greater benefit as a spouse than she would based on her own
earnings history, there is, of course, no marginal linkage from her tax to benefits.
The most striking result to be seen in Table 5 is that in no case is the
marginal linkage as high as one. Single-earner couples in the 32-percent
bracket of benefit determination and with low income-tax rates have a linkage
of nearly three-fourths; all others do substantially worse. Family status has
a substantial effect on linkage. Thus, the provision of a joint-survivor
annuity to married males produces more than a doubling of the marginal Linkage
(as also the total benefit) given to single males. It might also be noted that
the sum of the linkages for husband and wife in two-earner couples is about the
same as the linkages for single males and females with comparable earnings;
only the division of the linkage differs.
In viewing Table 5, one should be aware of the following anomalies. The
net-of-tax linkages for one-earner couples with earnings levels of $20,000 or
more are not based simply on the gross-of-tax linkages for the 15-percent
bracket. There is some possibility that the husband will die before
retirement with an earnings history which puts the determination of his widow's
benefit in the 32-percent bracket, The linkages for such cases are weighted by
their probability. Also, for two-earner couples at the $40,000 earnings level
husbands and wives are in different brackets of the benefit-computation formula.
29It should also be noted that the extent of linkage varies with age. For
the computation of benefits one's earnings history is indexed to wages, which
are assunied to grow at a real rate of l percent. Our real discount rate
is 3 percent. Thus one's later wages "receive too low an interest rate" for a
shorter period and one's later marginal taxes yield a greater amount in
marginal benefits. Furthermore, in the benefit computation formula only the 35
highest years of indexed earnings are considered, so that marginal taxes in
other years have no linkage to benefits. Because we assume that wages increase
with age as well as with economy-wide wage growth, in our examples all taxes
paid through age 31 have no marginal linkage to benefit (the retirement age for
the 1960 cohort is 67). For taxes paid at age 40, the marginal linkages for
men are about 1.23 times those reported for taxes paid over one's lifetime; for
women the corresponding multiple is about 1.21 (these figures differ by sex
because mortality varies by sex). For taxes paid at age 55, marginal linkages
are 1.64 times greater for men and 1.55 times greater for women than the
proportionately distributed taxes.
Table 6 considers the importance of "sunk" taxes in determining a family's
interest in relation to possible changes in the Social Security system. It
compares transfers and internal rates of return which various mid-career
households can expect based only on future taxes with transfer and internal
rates of return based on past taxes as well.
For nearly all households the internal rate of return (where positive) at
least doubles. For higher-income single-earner couples a "bad deal" becomes,
treating bygones as bygones, a "good deal" while for higher-income households
of other configurations a very bad deal becomes only moderately bad. Thus the
$40,000 two-earner couple finds that its present value of sunk taxes exceeds by
$10,000 its expected $87,000 net loss from Social Security. Single males with
30Table 6
The Political Problem in Social Security:
Transfers and Rates of Returns Considering
All Taxes Paid (A) vs. Only Taxes from 1987 on (B),
1945 Cohort. (Tranfers in 1985 dollars, discounted














P.V. Transfer 13,72738,405 3,01027,425 -19,0385,640 -6,59517,577
Rate of Return 3.74% 7.33% 3.18% 6.57% 1.42%4.00% 2.55% 5.56%
$15,000
P.V. Transfer 4,01041,027 -13,09823,525 -35,2071,811 -19,29416,933
Rate of Return 3.16% 6.43% 2.38% 5.34% 0.89%3.23% 2.04% 4.79%
$20,000
P.V. Transfer -4,49644,826 -26,89121,940 -51,545 -2,224 -31,10517,176
Rate of Return 2.86% 5.96% 1.99% 4,75% 0.57% 2.78% 1.79% 4.42%
$25,000
P.V. Transfer -18,13840,484 -40,915 20,122 -69,509 -10,888 -45,49211,665
Rate of Return 2.49% 5.30% 1.71% 4.34% 0.11% 2.07% 1.45% 3.82%
$30,000
P.V. Transfer -27,37036,308 -54,19919,046 -84,216 -20,538 -59,087 3,468
Rate of Return 2.30% 4.82% 1.54% 4.09% -0.25% 1.44% 1.13% 3.22%
$40,000
P,V. Transfer -34,936 31,232 -87,30710,295 -89,323 -23,156 -71,696 -4,950
Rate of Return 2.10% 4.57% 1.12% 3.47% -0.43% 1.25% 0.83% 2.71%
$50,000
P.V. Transfer -39,750 26,418 -123,975 -8,097 -91,721 -25,553 -75,133 -8,386
Rate of Return 1.95% 4.36% 0.61% 2.68% -0.60% 1.03% 0.68% 2.50%
$60,000
P.V. Transfer -42,758 23,409 -152,854 -26,620-92,919 -26,751 -76,850 -10,104
Rate of Return 1.86% 4.22% 0.26% 2,06% -0.68% 0.91% 0.60% 2.40%
$80,000
P.V. Transfer -45,165 21,002 -169,769 -36,855-94,715 -28,548 -79,428 -12,682
Rate of Return 1.78% 4.11% 0.05% 1.76% -0.82% 0.74% 0.47% 2,23%
31negative rates of return can expect positive rates of return on their remaining
contributions -whiletheir losses are reduced by seventy percent or more. For
low-income households of all configurations and all moderate-income households
other than single males, net transfers considering only future taxes are
solidly positive.
The result of this is that many for whom Social Security is a bad deal
over their lives as a whole would vote to continue the system as it is rather
*
than doing away with it.
*
Indeed they might vote to increase both taxes and benefits, leaving later
generations with greater negative transfers.
327. Conclusion
The results of this research certainly indicate that Social Security
offers vastly different terms to households in various circumstances. The
declining rates of return and transfers for later cohorts are probably
inescapable given the maturing and the pay-as-you-go nature of the system.
However, the magnitude of the differences in treatment of households of
different income or marital status are enormous and receive little attention
relative to the much smaller distributional issues which are prominently
debated when considering income tax reform. Our feeling is that the
desirability of the transfers of the existing Social Security system deserves
more attention.
Our examination of the marginal linkage of taxes and benefits indicated
that only the extremely poor receive an extra dollar's worth of benefits for an
extra dollar of taxes. For many households, the marginal linkage is only 15 to
30 cents, indicating that most of their Social Security contributions are
correctly viewed as taxes.
The paper also offers a possible explanation of why Social Security
retains widespread political support despite modest and very uneven expected
rates of return. The reason offered is that it is completely rational for
voters to treat their past Social Security taxes as "sunk" and simply evaluate
the program according to future benefits and taxes. Since the tax payments
precede the retirement benefits, any evaluation which truncates the early years
will bias the resulting rates of return upwards.
Combined with the inevitable reexamination of the long run financial
solvency of Social Security, these results suggest that explicit recognition of
the immense distributional impact of Social Security be an important input into
decisions concerning future reforms.
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Al. Sensitivity of Results to Real Discount Rates
The extent of one's gains or losses under the Social Security system
depends in large part on the real discount rate one applies to one's expected
streams of taxes and benefits. Because benefits come later in life than taxes,
a higher discount rate corresponds to a lower net transfer.
Table 7 examines some of the cases from Table 3A to compare the present
values of taxes, benefits, and transfers which result from applying different
real discount rates. The low-income couples, whose internal rates of return
are between three percent and four percent have negative transfers when the
higher discount rate is used instead of the three percent used in Table 3A.
The higher-income single-earner couple, which has a negative transfer at a
discount rate of three percent, has a positive transfer at a rate of two
percent. The higher-income two earner couple, however, has a negative
transfer even at a rate of two percent.
It will be noted that the present values of taxes for each case here are
roughly equal at each of the three discount rates. This is because discounting is
done to about the middle of their taxpaying years. While later taxes are discounted
more heavily at higher discount rates, earlier taxes are also grossed up more heavily.
A.2. Sensitivity of Results to the Age-Profile of Wages
Elimination of the age-profile of wages reduces both the taxes one pays,
especially in ones' later working years, and one's benefits. Although one's
marginal linkage of benefits to taxes is greater in one's later years, the
result of this reduced participation in the Social Security system is still,
usually, to increase both one's internal rate of return and one's net transfer.
Table 8 considers the difference made by the age-profile of wages for
various households in the 1945 cohort.
35Table 7
Sensitivity of Present Values of Benefits, Taxes, and Transfers
to Different Discount Rates for
1945 Cohort, Various Family Types and Earnings Levels






(Rate of Return 3.74%)
P.V. Benefits 89,07462,67944,501
P.V. Taxes 50,09748,95148,553
P.V. Transfer 38,97813,727 -4,052
$10,000 Two-earner Couple
(Rate of Return 3.18%)
P.V. Benefits 72,11050,93636,293
P.V. Taxes 48,99147,92647,597
P.V. Transfer 23,119 3,010 -11,303
$30,000 Single-earner Couple
(Rate of Return 2.30%)
P.V. Benefits 155,083 109,128 77,480
P.V. Taxes 141,229 136,498 133,830
P.V. Transfer 13,857-27,370 -56,348
$30,000 Two-earner Couple
(each earns .5)
(Rate of Return 1.54%)
P.V. Benefits 126,837 89,57863,818
P.V. Taxes 146,973 143,777 142,791
P.V. Transfer -20,134 -54,199 -78,973
36Table 8
Sensitivity of Results to Age Profile of Wages for
1945 Cohort, $30,000 Earnings Level, Various Family Types
(1985 dollars discounted at rate 3% to 1985)
Family Type









Begin work at age 21
Age profile of wages
(base case)
P.V. Benefits 109,128 89,578 52,282 71,715
P.V. Taxes 136,498 143,777 136,498 130,802
P.V. Transfer -27,370 -54,199 -84,216 -59,087
Rate of Return 2.30% 1.54% -0.25% 1.13%
Begin work at age 21
No age profile of
wages
P.V. Benefits 100,386 80,089 47,985 68,805
P.V. Taxes 118,239 129,423 118,239 121,755
P.V. Transfer -17,851 -49,335 -70,252 -52,949
Rate of Return 2.50% 1.56% 0.06% 1.25%
37